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1 Introduction
Despite the growing trend of trade liberalization, the use of temporary trade barriers, such
as antidumping and countervailing duties, and safeguards, is on the rise (see Blonigen and
Prusa, 2016). Antidumping measures are particularly important as they are among the most
intensively used forms of trade restrictions.1 An importing country can levy duties on a trade
partner if imported products are dumped and causing injury to domestic import-competing
industries (WTO Antidumping Agreement, Article 3). Specifically, dumping refers to the
practice of exporting a product at a price that is lower than the price usually charged in its
home market or less than its production cost. The proliferation of antidumping measures has
stimulated the research to evaluate their effects on protected products, firms, and industries.
While the literature has gained significant insights on the effects of antidumping measures
on the protected import-competing firms,2 a much scarcer literature looks at the correspond-
ing effects on the affected foreign counterparts. How do antidumping measures halt trade
flows? Do these import restrictions shift exports to alternative markets? In particular, how
do the affected firms respond to these market-specific tariff shocks? Do they deflect the tar-
geted products to third countries or switch to other similar or related products? Do these
measures have spillover effects that go beyond the affected products? Despite their impor-
tance for firm performance, the way these trade restrictions shape the export activities across
products within firms is poorly understood. In this paper, I attempt to fill these gaps by
exploring the effects of US antidumping measures on the export behavior of Chinese firms.
The analysis of how targeted firms respond to such trade restrictions could give us the story
from the flip side of the coin and complete the picture of the effectiveness of antidumping
measures.
China serves as a suitable country for this analysis for several reasons. First, China is
one of the countries most targeted by antidumping investigations, and the US is the leading
initiator. This is possibly due to the fact that the US has an increasing trade deficit with
China, and its loss of manufacturing employment (see Pierce and Schott, 2012; David et al.,
2013). For example, China made up 20% of the US antidumping caseload between 2000
and 2006.3 Second, the US is a major trade partner with China, and it is one of the most
important markets for Chinese exporters. For firms that have exported to the US during 2000
1For example, according to WTO notifications, between 1995 and 2010 a total of 2503 antidumping mea-
sures were imposed worldwide, while in the same period safeguards and countervailing (CV) duties accounted
for only 101 and 158 measures, respectively.
2This includes Konings and Vandenbussche (2005, 2008, 2013); Pierce (2011).
3The US initiated a total of 247 antidumping investigations worldwide between 2000 and 2006, in which
48 caseloads were against China.
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to 2006, 25% of their total export value was shipped to the US. This means that a substantial
amount of trade could potentially be shifted to third markets upon the imposition of US trade
restrictions. Third, there is a wealth of available data pertaining to Chinese firms covering
a substantial period replete with antidumping practices, which makes China an exceptional
case for identifying the impact of antidumping measures on firms.
The objective of this paper is to explore the patterns of export adjustments to antidumping
shocks among firms. To do so, I employ a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. Specif-
ically, my identification strategy is based on the comparison of outcome variables (such as
participation, the number of exporters, export value, volume, and price) for firms exporting
the affected products, compared to firms that do not. That is, my treatment group consists
of products that are under investigations and subject to antidumping duties. The control
group includes all uninvestigated products within the 4-digit HS4 product category to which
the affected products belong.
I first examine the overall responses at the product level. Using detailed Chinese customs
data between 2000 and 2006, I find strong evidence that US antidumping measures severely
distort bilateral trade flows between these two countries. Specifically, antidumping-punished
products experience a drastic fall by somewhere between 50% and 85% in export flows. Ad-
ditionally, there is a significant adverse effect on the extensive margin. That is, antidumping
measures not only discourage existing exporters from shipping to the US, but also lead to a
sharp decrease in the number of exporters. I then estimate the impact of US antidumping
measures on Chinese exports to non-US markets. I provide some evidence that the US import
restrictions result in a decline in Chinese exports of punished products to alternative mar-
kets. One implication derived from this result is that antidumping has negative externalities
on trade beyond the offending country. It is associated with collateral damage that spreads
to third markets.
Next, I look at export adjustments at the firm level to deepen my analysis of how firms
react to trade restrictions. We lack empirical evidence of how exporting firms behave when
faced with export restrictions. The existing literature does not inform us whether the affected
exporters stop shipping or reduce exports to the initiators of antidumping measures. Also, it
does not tell us whether and how exporting firms adjust their exports across destinations.
To this end, I study how firms’ specific patterns of trade are affected by this particular
form of trade restriction. Specifically, I look at changes in firms’ behavior when confronted
with regulatory barriers concerning participation in the export markets, values, quantities of
4HS refers to the Harmonized System, which is an internationally standardized system of names and
numbers to classify traded products.
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exports, and pricing strategy. As antidumping measures in general take form of ad valorem
tariffs, they can be thought of as export costs for exporters. Assuming the existence of a cost
of entry in a certain market, recent trade models (e.g. Melitz, 2003) predict that only the
most productive firms in the industry will continue to export after an increase in such costs.
Therefore, the imposition of import restrictions could affect both the probability of entering
a foreign market (extensive margin) and the associated export flows (intensive margin). My
results show that antidumping measures not only reduce existing trade flows but also decrease
export participation at the firm level.
I then turn to the question of whether the imposition of contingency tariffs on products,
impact the trade of affected firms to other markets. To answer this question, I estimate the
export patterns of targeted products into other markets of firms that were hit by the tariffs,
compare to firms that export the same products into the same destination but not punished
by the measures. I find that Chinese firms exposed to the disruption of the US market are less
likely to export the targeted products to alternative markets. There is also a little evidence
that firms adjust their export flows to third markets. These findings imply that antidumping
measures may have a deterrent effect which spreads to other destinations within firms.
A significant and novel contribution of this paper is that I study the extent to which a
tariff shock in the US influences firms’ export participation, value, volume, and prices for
other untargeted products across markets. I first investigate whether firms switch exports to
other products in the US. I find that firms exposed to the US trade shocks reduce their export
flows of other uninvestigated products to the US. This finding suggests that an increase in
export costs in one market leads firms to cut all exports to that market due to economies of
scale. In other words, antidumping creates negative externalities that go beyond the targeted
products.
I next discuss how the US antidumping measures generate spillovers across products within
firms in alternative markets. I find that an export cost increase in the US induce a rise in trade
flows in alternative markets, but it hurts export participation. In other words, antidumping
causes trade relationship to fail, but multi-product firms tend to switch exports to other
unaffected products in alternative markets. These findings indicate that existing exporters
reallocate their products across destinations following trade restrictions. To this end, I assess
how the relative change in trade costs across countries shape firms’ export pattern.
These results are relevant for policy. One implication derived from the current set of
results is that antidumping measures have a deterrent effect on the export behavior of af-
fected exporters, improving our understanding of the breadth and extent of such measures.
This study also provides new insights into the roles that contingent protection has played in
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supporting trade liberalization.
This research advances the current literature in three ways. First, my analysis builds on a
small but growing literature documenting the effects of antidumping measures on firms from
targeted countries. Lu et al. (2013) use monthly data on Chinese exports from 2000 to 2006
and find that there is a substantial negative effect of US antidumping protections on export
volumes. Similarly, Shen and Fu (2014) document that US antidumping actions against
China decrease China-US bilateral trade, leading to trade diversion from other sources. My
paper differs from prior studies in that I focus on within-firm adjustments. In light of the
increasingly heavy use of antidumping measures, my estimates of these microeconomic effects
are a valuable additions to the current evaluation of such policies.
Second, concerning the literature on how trade policy uncertainty affects export decisions,
my main result that Chinese firms’ export responses involve reallocation through the exten-
sive margin support recent work in international trade. Debaere and Mostashari (2010), for
example, provide evidence that extensive margin responses to US tariff policy changes had
an effect on overall US imports from that country. The reallocation effects that I observe are
also similar to the results in Crowley et al. (2016). They reveal that the use of antidumping
measures in one market leads to a decline in entry both for the targeted and closely-related
products in that market.
Finally, my paper also contributes to the literature that seeks to understand how changes
in export costs have influenced within-firm adjustments across products and destinations.
The relevance of this issue is highlighted in the work of Goldberg et al. (2010); Berthou and
Fontagne´ (2013); Bernard et al. (2014), all of which show how a reduction in trade costs affect
the export margins of firms in relation to export decisions, the number of product exported,
and the average sales per product. My paper complements their work by looking at how
increases in trade barriers changes in firms’ product mix.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief
summary of the antidumping investigation process in the US. Section 3 describes the data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 defines the treatment and control groups, as well as
a description of the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical findings. Section 6
concludes.
2 The US Antidumping Procedures
In this section, I provide a brief overview of how an antidumping investigation in the US
is carried out and describe the possible outcomes. The flow chart of the US antidumping
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proceedings is presented in Figure 8 in the Appendix.
To initiate an antidumping investigation, an interested party (e.g. domestic firms and/or
labor unions) must file a petition and submit it to the relevant government agencies: the
Department of Commerce (DoC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC). The petition
contains two pieces of essential information for my study. First, it must specify the exact
product that is alleged to have been dumped in the US. The product is defined at the US 8-
or 10-digit HS level.5 Second, the petition has to indicate which country(-ies) is(are) allegedly
dumping. Only the countries named in the petition are subject to the investigation.
Within 20 days after the date on which the petition is filed, the DoC determines whether
the petition is affirmative. If so, the investigation proceeds on a statutory timeline, with the
DoC determining whether the product in question was sold at less than fair value (LTFV)
and the ITC determining whether domestic firms suffered a material injury.
Within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, the ITC makes a preliminary
determination on whether the domestic industry is suffering (or is threatened by) material
injury. A negative preliminary decision would end the proceeding. With the affirmative pre-
liminary ITC determination, the DoC makes a preliminary duty determination within the
next 115 days, of whether the product named in the petition is sold at LTFV. If the DoC pre-
liminary determination is affirmative, a preliminary duty is imposed from this time onwards.
With a negative determination, the DoC nevertheless continues to conduct the investiga-
tion, although the preliminary duty is not imposed. The DoC makes a final determination
of whether the subject imported merchandise is being sold or is likely to be sold at LTFV
within 75 days of its preliminary decision.
If the DoC final determination is negative, the investigation is terminated. Otherwise, the
ITC has 45 (or 75) days to conduct the final phase of investigation and make a determination.
Once both the DoC and the ITC reach affirmative final determinations, the DoC issues an
antidumping order to levy final antidumping duties within seven days. Once imposed, the
antidumping duty can be in place for a maximum of five years, except if extended (always
by sequences of a maximum of five years) through reviews because of evidence of continuing
dumping and injury.
Antidumping measures usually take the form of an ad valorem duty, but could also be
a specific duty, a price/quantity undertaking, or a combination of these. In either case, the
measures are not only country-industry-wide duty but also firm-specific. That is, relevant
5At the international level, the HS for classifying goods is a 6-digit code system. A code with a low number
of digits defines broad categories of products; additional digits indicate sub-divisions into more detailed
definitions. Countries can add more digits for their own coding to subdivide the definitions further according
to their own needs.
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US administrative agencies often calculate separate duties for individual companies that are
responsible for the largest share of the investigated product. The remaining firms exporting
the targeted product are subject to an industry-wide antidumping duty. As the US classifies
China as a nonmarket economy (NME), Chinese domestic prices are considered unreliable,
so a surrogate country is used to calculate the antidumping duty. In practice, firm-specific
duties are substantially lower than the industry-wide one (see Figure 9 in the Appendix).
The overall investigation process for antidumping cases can be divided into three stages:
(1) the initiation phase, (2) the preliminary duty phase, and (3) the final duty phase. The
initiation phase refers to the period from initiation until any preliminary duty is levied.
The preliminary duty phase starts from when the US importers have to pay the preliminary
antidumping duty until the end of the investigation. During this stage, the investigation
can be withdrawn by the petitioner(s) or suspended if an agreement is reached between the
affected foreign exporters and the DoC. The final duty phase begins on the date that the
final antidumping duty is imposed and continues until the date the antidumping order is
revoked. Antidumping investigations usually are concluded within one year (except in special
circumstances when the investigation may last up to 18 months).
3 Data
I employ data from the following sources: the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2015)
and Chinese customs data between 2000 and 2006.6
The antidumping data come from the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) of the world
bank. They cover all antidumping cases by all user countries in the world, with each investi-
gation mapped to the targeted HS codes from 1980 to 2014. For each antidumping case, the
GAD includes detailed product information (classified at the 10-digit HS level), the initiation
date, the preliminary and final determination dates and decisions, along with the final rem-
edy. I focus on all the antidumping proceedings carried out by the US against China between
2000 and 2006. I aggregate these products from the 10-digit to the 6-digit HS level.
The Chinese firms’ cross-border transactions-level data are obtained from China’s General
Administration of Customs. It records monthly import and export transactions of all Chinese
firms with universal trading partners from 2000 to 2006. Each trade is recorded at the Chinese
8-digit HS level7 with a quantity, a value, and a unit value as the ratio of the shipment value
to quantity. Quantity is measured by one of twelve different units of measurement (such as
6I thank Nankai University for providing the data.
7The number of distinct product codes in the Chinese 8-digit HS classification is comparable to that in
the 10-digit HS trade data for the US (Manova and Yu, 2016).
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kilograms, square meters, et cetera). Value and unit value are in current US dollar.
I aggregate the monthly customs data to the annual level to avoid the seasonality and
lumpiness typical of monthly data. More importantly, most firms do not export a given
product to a given market in every month. I also aggregate export products from the 8-digit
to the 6-digit HS level. I then match Chinese transactions-level data with US antidumping
investigations against China, at the 6-digit HS level. It is the most disaggregated product
category that is internationally comparable.
Figure 1: US antidumping investigations against China and the rest of world
Note: Elaboration based on the World Bank Global Antidumping Database from 2000 to 2006. Considering all antidumping
investigations launched by the US against third-countries products. The share of Chinese products measured as the ratio
between number of US investigations against Chinese products and the total number of US antidumping proceedings against
third-countries imports.
There are a total of 47 US antidumping cases against China between 2000 and 2006,
which cover 147 unique products at the 6-digit HS level. Among the investigated products,
77 products ended up with affirmative final determinations and antidumping duties were
imposed on them. In addition, 49 products had affirmative preliminary ITC determinations
but received negative final ITC determinations; 2 products were withdrawn before the final
ITC determination. The rest of the 15 products either withdrew or were given negative
decisions at the preliminary ITC stage. Figure 1 shows that the number of products are
investigated for dumping by the US has decreased over time. However, the ratio of Chinese
products which have been investigated products is consistently high. Table 8, in the Appendix,
lists the antidumping cases and related products that are covered in this paper. Figure 10,
in the Appendix, illustrates the number of US antidumping initiations against China by year
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and the ratio of affirmative decisions.
The matched panel data from 2000 to 2006 contain 3,953 product-year-destination level
observations and 1,213,138 firm-product-year-destination level observations. This level of
disaggregation allows me to study within-firm adjustments at both the extensive and intensive
margins of trade. I have 343 products at the 6-digit HS level in the matched data, with 77 of
these products are subject to antidumping duties.
4 The Empirical Framework
I proceed with the empirical analysis in two steps. First, I estimate the trade effects of
the US antidumping measures at the product level. Second, to gain a better understanding
of the mechanisms driving at the product level, I investigate how these import restrictions
shape firms’ export patterns.
Following Lu et al. (2013), I define the treatment group as the products that are under
investigation and subject to antidumping duties (referred as targeted products). Each product
in the treatment group is assigned a date of treatment and an ad valorem duty. The control
group contains all uninvestigated products within the 4-digit HS product category to which
the targeted products belong (referred as closely-related products). This procedure, therefore,
constructs a set of control products that are similar to the treated products.
4.1 Product-level Framework
To evaluate the effects of antidumping measures on Chinese products, I follow Autor
(2003) and pursue a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. I compare the export patterns
of targeted versus closely-related products by the following equation:
ypdt = γt + δp + β−4Dp,t+τ(τ<=−4) +
3∑
τ=−3,τ 6=−1
βτDp,t+τ + β4Dp,t+τ(τ>=4) + εpt, (1)
where subscripts p, d and t indicate the 6-digit HS product category, destination and year
respectively. I assume that the world consists of the United States (US) and the Rest of
the World (RoW), represented by subscript d. My dependent variables are: (i) a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 for a product p that has positive trade flows into a certain
product-destination in year t (0 otherwise)8, reflecting export participation; (ii) the number
of exporters in each product-destination-year combination; These two regressions estimate
the effect of antidumping measures at the extensive margin. (iii) the products’ export values
8If we observe positive trade flows of a product p into a certain destination in year t but no export
thereafter, we keep the zero observations in year t− 1 and t + 1.
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and quantities (in logs) to the US and the RoW. These regressions are used to capture the
intensive margin of trade;9 and (iv) the log of export prices, proxied by unit export values
(the ratio of export value to quantity).
Despite the dichotomous nature of some of my dependent variables, I estimate equation (1)
via ordinary least squares (OLS). I also include year fixed effects, γt, which control for overall
trends and aggregate shocks that may affect all products. The 6-digit HS product fixed
effects, δp, capture time-invariant product characteristics. The treatment variables Dp,t+τ
take value of one for product p in year t if we are exactly τ periods relative to the start of
antidumping investigation for product p. The treatment year is defined as the year in which
the investigation is initiated. Therefore, instead of a single treatment effect, I have included
3 anticipatory effects (β−4, β−3, β−2) and 5 post-treatment effects (β0, β1, β2, β3, β4). Of
these 8 indicator variables, the indicator variable Dp,t+τ(τ<=−4) is equal to one in each year,
starting with the 4th year before the investigation, while Dp,t+τ(τ>=4) is equal to one in each
year, starting with the 4th year after the investigation. The remaining indicator variables are
equal to one only in the relevant year.
The base year is the year before the investigation is initiated. As illustrated in Section
2, an antidumping investigation usually takes 280-420 days. Therefore, τ = 0 is the year
of investigation, while τ = 1 is the starting year that final antidumping duty is imposed.
The coefficients β−4, β−3, β−2 show whether the treatment and control groups have common
trends before the antidumping measures. If so, these coefficients should be close to zero and
jointly insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficients β0, β1, β2, β3, β4 show whether the
treatment effect fades out, stays constant, or even increases over time.
With this empirical specification, I first assess the trade destruction effect caused by
antidumping measures in the US market. That is, I estimate how these measures restrict
the trade of the targeted products relative to the closely-related ones from China to the
US. However, the export restrictions to the US can give rise to trade deflection, where a
destruction effect at the product level could be offset by an increase in product-level export
to other countries. Specifically, I investigate whether the US import restrictions increase the
exports of Chinese targeted products to the RoW. I assess these dynamic effects by comparing
the export patterns of the targeted and closely-related products in the RoW.
4.2 Firm-level Framework
The aforementioned analysis focuses on the effects of antidumping measures at the product
level. But an important and related question is whether these trade restrictions alter indi-
9The dependent variables in these regressions include only positive trade values.
10
vidual firms’ export behavior. In this section, I analyze how firms’ export patterns (whether
or not to export, and how much to export) and pricing strategy are changed when faced with
such restraints. More importantly, I examine whether these trade shocks lead to the reallo-
cation of activities across products within multi-product firms. By focusing on the responses
of exporters to such restrictions, I aim to shed new light on the contribution of firms and
product selection in export markets. It is important to understand how the results observed
at the product level translate into firm-level exports to gain a better understanding of the
underlying microeconomic adjustments.
Figure 2 provides a graphical explanation of multi-product firms in my analysis. The
punished firm is defined as an exporter of multiple 6-digit HS products both to the US and
the RoW, where at least one of its products is subject to an antidumping duty in the US. In
other words, every punished firm has direct experience of a tariff hike for a product in the US
market. The unpunished firm refers to an exporter of a set of 6-digit products that do not
face any antidumping duty anywhere in the world. Products A and B are closely-related to
each other, as they belong to the same 4-digit HS product category, but product A is subject
to an antidumping duty in the US.
Figure 2: Product and market structure of multi-product firms
4.2.1 Trade Destruction
I first examine whether antidumping measures distort trade for individual Chinese ex-
porters to the US. I again follow Autor (2003) and identify the effect at the firm-product-
11
destination-yearly level using the following equation:
yfpdt = γt + δp + λf + β−4Dp,t+τ(τ<=−4) +
3∑
τ=−3.τ 6=−1
βτDp,t+τ + β4Dp,t+τ(τ>=4) + εfpt,
(2)
where the subscripts f , p, d and t denote firm, 6-digit HS product line, destination and
year, respectively. The destination d here refers to the US. My dependent variables are:
(i) a dummy variable that equals one if a firm exports a 6-digit HS product to the US in
year t (0 otherwise).10 This dependent variable explores the extensive margin of trade, i.e. a
firm’s decision to participate in exporting (a given product-destination). The other dependent
variables are: (ii) a firm’s export values and quantities (in logs) to the US, where zero trade
flows are dropped from the analysis; and (iii) the price of exported goods (in logs) in the US,
proxied by unit export values. I examine the extent to which antidumping measures affect
the intensive margins and the export prices of incumbent firms. My hypothesis is that the
cost-enhancing antidumping measures have a negative effect on trade flows.
My data set exhibits a substantial fraction of zeros at the firm-product-destination-year
level, with over 50% of trade values and quantities found to be zero. There may be two
reasons for the zero trade flows: there truly is no bilateral trade, or bilateral trade values
are not reported.11 If I take the logarithm of the value or quantity of trade and use an
OLS-based estimation methodology, all observations with zero trade flows would drop out
of my estimation sample. This would likely create a bias of my estimated policy impact:
if antidumping measures were prohibitive and caused Chinese exporters to completely stop
exporting the product under such restrictions, then I would likely underestimate the true
effect.
However, this simple truncating method is better than adding a small constant (1 dollar,
say) to the value of trade before taking logarithms when employing OLS-based estimation
methodology (Head and Mayer, 2014). Because retaining the zero observations without using
an estimator that accounts for the limited-dependent nature of the model would lead the
results to depend on the unit of measurement. The estimated effect of common currencies
switches from negative to positive simply by changing units from dollars to thousands of
dollars. For this reason, I simply drop the zero trade flows in my regression.
The explanatory variables are the same as in Equation (1). The coefficients of interest are
βτ , which measure the average difference between the control and treatment groups. Since
10If we observe positive exports of a product p by a firm to a certain destination in year t but no export
after that, we keep the zero observations in year t− 1 and t + 1.
11Zero trade and missing trade values are typically not satisfactorily distinguishable in trade matrices.
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a year dummy must be omitted, I follow the standard procedure of omitting the first year
immediately preceding the investigation. In addition to product and year fixed effects, I in-
clude a set of firm fixed effects (λf ) to control for firm-specific and time-invariant unobserved
characteristics which might affect the trade performance of exporters. Standard errors are
clustered at the 6-digit HS product level. Figure 3 provides a schematic of the treatment
and control groups for this analysis. The treatment group refers to firms exporting to the
US a 6-digit HS product that is subject to an antidumping duty in the US (targeted prod-
ucts). The control group consists of firm-product-destination triplets that do not face any
antidumping duty anywhere in the world. The products in the control group include all
uninvestigated products within the 4-digit HS product category to which the targeted prod-
ucts belong (closely-related products). Notably, the control sample also includes the punished
firms that export the closely-related products.
Figure 3: Trade destruction to the US at the firm-product level
4.2.2 Trade Deflection
As exporting to the US becomes tougher, firms may start a new trading relationship to
compensate their losses in the US market. That is, I examine whether the US antidumping
measures caused Chinese firms to deflect trade, leading to an increase in the exports of targeted
products to third (non-US) markets. My empirical strategy to evaluate these effects relies
again on a difference-in-difference estimation. Here, I compare the export performances in
non-US markets of firms that have been directly exposed to the trade restrictions to the non-
exposed firms. The estimation specification in this setting is similar to Equation (2), with
the only change being the replacement of the outcome variables yfpdt for the RoW.
Figure 4 outlines my comparison. Firms 1 and 2 both export product A, which is subject
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to an antidumping duty in the US. Nevertheless, only Firm 1 is hit by an antidumping duty as
it exports the targeted product A to the US. Firm 2 is not hit by this tariff increase in the US
because it only exports the targeted product A to the RoW. Therefore, the treatment group
consists of punished firms exporting to the RoW a 6-digit HS product that is subject to an
antidumping duty in the US. The control group refers to unpunished firms exporting an US
antidumping-targeted product but only to the RoW. Therefore, by definition, exporters who
trade only to the RoW do not shift exports. I am interested in how existing multi-product
firms reallocate the targeted products across destinations following export restrictions.
Figure 4: Trade deflection to the RoW at the firm-product level 1
To be consistent with the product-level trade deflection analysis, I also use another control
group which is graphically presented in Figure 5. The control group is represented by Firm 2
exporting product B to the RoW, which is not subject to the US antidumping duty but is in
the 4-digit HS product category with product A. To put it differently, I focus on the impact
of antidumping measures on Chinese firms’ export behavior towards alternative markets by
using a different control group.
Figure 5: Trade deflection to the RoW at the firm-product level 2
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4.2.3 Within-Firm Product Switching
To further enhance our understanding of antidumping measures, and in particular of how
US antidumping measures against China spill over across products within firms, I explore
whether an antidumping action against one product influences firms’ export behavior (partic-
ipation, value, volume shipped and price strategy) for other products both to the US and the
RoW. Specifically, I consider that antidumping measures can have externalities that spread
to other products within firms. Figure 6 presents a schematic to illustrate this problem. Firm
1 is an antidumping-punished firm because it exports product A to the US, which is subject
to an antidumping duty. I investigate the export pattern of Firm A’s closely-related product
B both to the US and RoW, to see whether a tariff hike for one product within a firm has
an effect on its export performance for other products.
In other words, I study the extent to which a cost shock in one market impacts firm
choice of export participation, value, quantity and price across markets. It is important to
understand this because it has important implications for the welfare effect of trade policy
changes. I focus on the role of product spillovers in the dynamics of firm-product-level exports.
Figure 6: Within-firm product switching behavior to the US/RoW
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Product-level Trade Destruction
Before turning to the estimates of Equation (1), I provide a visual summary of the time
trend of export values for treatment and control at quarterly intervals spanning from four
years prior to four years after the antidumping investigations. The vertical line marks the
date of initiation of the investigations. This figure provides initial evidence that antidumping
measures do affect the export values. First, there is an upward trend in the export values
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for both groups before the investigation. Second, it seems that before the investigation,
the treatment and control groups do not exhibit differential time trend, indicating that the
pre-existing trends are similar for both groups. Third, antidumping measures have a clearly
dampening effect on the export values of the treatment group.
Figure 7: Time trend of product-level export values to the US
The regression results for the trade destruction effects of antidumping measures at the
product level are shown in Table 1. In column (1), the dependent variable is the export
participation dummy for exporting to the US. Before the investigation, the coefficients (β−4,
β−3,β−2) are close to zero and jointly insignificant, which indicate that the DID common trends
assumption seems satisfied in this context. Moreover, it clearly emerges that antidumping
measures are associated with a modest but meaningful reduction in the probability of a prod-
uct being exported to the US. Specifically, I find that antidumping-targeted products are 15
percentage points less likely to be exported compare to the closely-related products in the
second year after the investigation. Their export probability is further reduced by approx-
imately 28 percentage points in the third years after the measures. However, the negative
effects are short-lived, only lasting for two years. From the 4th year after the initiation, there
is a small reduction in export participation, but it is not significant. Antidumping measures
hence act as an additional cost of exporting to the US market and increase the threshold for
export participation for a short period.
In a further extensive-margin estimation, I test their effects on the number of exporters
in every product-destination-year cell. The results are shown in column (2). The number of
exporters exporting the targeted products in the first three years following the investigation
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is between 20% to 30% less than the number of firms exporting the closely-related products.12
Notably, the presence of antidumping measures reduces the total number of firms active in
the US market by 50% from year four onwards. In other words, the presence of antidumping
measures is not only associated with negative estimated impact on export participation, but
also with a drastic decrease in the number of exporters.
Column (3) of Table 1 shows the OLS estimates of Equation (1), when the dependent
variable is the log of export values in the US. The estimated coefficients of the treatment
leads in this column are close to zero, showing little evidence of an anticipatory response
for the products about to be subject to antidumping duties. Nevertheless, a strong pattern
emerges year one after the investigation (the starting point of imposition of the antidumping
duties). Export values decline is sizable, by around 50% to 80% in years 1 to 3 following
initiation of the investigations. They further go down by about 85% in year 4 forward. The
point estimates are significant at conventional levels. There is strong evidence of a significant
decline in export values of the targeted products relative to the closely-related ones, following
the initiation of antidumping measures. The subsequent column repeats these estimates when
using the log of export quantities as the dependent variable. The pattern of coefficients, in
this case, is very similar to column (3), providing robust evidence that antidumping measures
severely distort bilateral trade flows between China and the US.
Column (5) documents how antidumping measures affect export prices, proxied by the
unit values at the 6-digit HS level. However, this estimation may suffer from measurement
error, as the unit values I calculate may be polluted by aggregation across firms. The results
reveal that the price changes do not contribute a lot to variations in the export flows to the
US. That is, export prices are remarkably stable over time, despite the antidumping measures
that the products are subject to.
It looks odd that I do not find any price adjustments, since firms should have the incentive
to manipulate their duty margin by lowering their domestic price.13 However, for nonmarket
economies such as China, the domestic price is irrelevant to the calculation of the dumping
margin. Instead, the costs from a surrogate country are used. Consequently, there is no
incentive for Chinese firms to alter their domestic prices in response to such trade shocks.
Therefore, it is not surprising that I do not find much price of a response.
Taken together, these estimates strongly support the inference that US antidumping mea-
sures considerably reduce the export flows of the targeted products from China, by 50%-85%
12The exact percentage difference in the predicted y when Dp,t = 1 versus when Dp,t = 0 is %4y =
100× (eβ − 1).
13By lowering the price in the home market, the product’s “normal value” is then lower and firms can set
a low price for their exports.
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on average. Furthermore, they also causes the targeted products less likely to be exported
and decrease the number of exporters. More specifically, I find that antidumping measures
drive 50% of exporters out of the US markets. Given that it could take over a year for an
antidumping investigation to result in the imposition of a definitive import restriction, the
finding of no contemporaneous responses is understandable.
I also use quarterly product-level export data as robustness check. This allows me to avoid
some of the partial year bias present in annual data and gives me more precise estimates. Table
9 in the Appendix presents the estimation results. The estimates confirm that the imposition
of US import restrictions negatively affect both the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
Table 1: Trade destruction effect on the US at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
invetigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before -0.097 -0.100 -0.321 -0.335 0.013
(0.078) (0.200) (0.489) (0.506) (0.106)
3 Years Before -0.124∗ 0.027 -0.253 -0.182 -0.072
(0.071) (0.134) (0.277) (0.274) (0.069)
2 Years Before 0.017 0.084 0.039 0.136 -0.097
(0.032) (0.062) (0.138) (0.182) (0.073)
Investigation Starts 0.020 0.031 0.006 0.140 -0.134
(0.040) (0.077) (0.211) (0.241) (0.131)
1 Years After -0.051 -0.223∗∗ -0.640∗∗ -0.533 -0.110
(0.037) (0.102) (0.270) (0.326) (0.135)
2 Years After -0.156∗∗∗ -0.440∗∗∗ -1.617∗∗∗ -1.525∗∗∗ -0.093
(0.041) (0.114) (0.369) (0.371) (0.120)
3 Years After -0.286∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗ -1.594∗∗∗ -1.689∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.058) (0.150) (0.376) (0.386) (0.126)
4 or More Years After -0.011 -0.706∗∗∗ -1.862∗∗∗ -2.007∗∗∗ 0.142
(0.062) (0.160) (0.474) (0.521) (0.160)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2059 1786 1786 1785 1785
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.931 0.802 0.767 0.847
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.2 Product-level Trade Deflection
The US use of antidumping measures against China may impose an externality on alterna-
tive markets. Table 2 presents the results in which I examine how the imposition of US import
restraints affect Chinese exports of the targeted products to third country markets. In column
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(1) the dependent variable is the export participation dummy to the RoW. The estimated
coefficients for treatment leads are consistently negative and significant at the conventional
levels, suggesting that the treatment and control groups do not have parallel trends before
antidumping measures. Therefore, one might worry that they might differ in unobservable
ways that invalidate the estimates. In column (2), I estimate their effects on the number of
Chinese firms exporting to the RoW. I find that antidumping measures are negatively corre-
lated with the number of exporters. Specifically, in the year immediately following initiation,
the drop in the number of exporters appears to be small (albeit not significantly), followed in
years 1 to 3 by a considerable reduction in the number of exporters. That is, the number of
firms in the first three years following the investigation decreases by between 15% and 22%,
and these point estimates are consistently significant. Combined with the findings in column
(2) of Table 1, the results reveal that the US antidumping measures have led to a considerable
decline in the number of exporters both serving the US and the RoW.
The next two columns of Table 2 repeat the estimates for the products’ export values and
quantities in the RoW. First, we see relatively stable coefficients for the leads centered around
0, which yield no evidence of anticipatory effects. Second, there are significant short-term (3
years) negative effects of US antidumping measures on export flows of Chinese products to
third markets. That is, rather than an increase in exports to the RoW, US import constraints
are associated with a chilling effect on Chinese targeted products to alternative markets.
Specifically, in years 1 through 3 following the US antidumping measures, there is strong
evidence of an acceleration of export reductions. The US antidumping-targeted products
experience a sizable decline of 24% to 48% in export flows to the RoW during 1 to 3 years fol-
lowing the measures. These estimates lend support to the fact that US trade measures reduce
Chinese trade flows to alternative markets. However, these effects appear to be short-term,
lasting for 3 years, while the longer-run effects appear to be also negative but insignificant.
These findings are in line with Bown and Crowley (2010), who also document that the US
import restrictions against China have a chilling effect on Chinese exports to third markets.
The estimated coefficients for the price in column (5) are consistently negative and sig-
nificant, which imply a failure of the DID approach as both groups do not have the parallel
trends before the antidumping shocks. To summarize the results of Table 2, I find that the
products exposed to the trade disruption do not shift exports to other markets. On the con-
trary, I provide some evidence that US trade restrictions lead to a decline in Chinese exports
of the same products to alternative markets.
These findings are relevant to policy-making. One implication derived from the current
results is that targeted products may face an additional cost of antidumping, as they are not
19
able to deflect trade and recoup some of the losses. This suggests that antidumping measures
incur collateral damage and are even more detrimental to developing countries like China
than has previously been considered.
In a robustness check I use quarterly product-level export data. Table 10 in the Appendix
presents the estimation results. The results are similar to the ones in Table 2 which confirms
that antidumping measures have negative externalities that distort trade in other markets.
Table 2: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
invetigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before -0.058 0.062 0.065 -0.038 0.102∗
(0.047) (0.114) (0.227) (0.220) (0.061)
3 Years Before -0.109∗ 0.080 0.167 0.091 0.075∗
(0.062) (0.066) (0.107) (0.110) (0.044)
2 Years Before 0.025∗∗ 0.025 0.018 -0.015 0.033
(0.010) (0.044) (0.080) (0.086) (0.024)
Investigation Starts -0.021∗∗∗ -0.070 -0.274∗∗ -0.235∗∗ -0.039
(0.008) (0.050) (0.110) (0.114) (0.026)
1 Years After -0.007 -0.153∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.071) (0.126) (0.129) (0.035)
2 Years After -0.018∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗ -0.043
(0.010) (0.079) (0.129) (0.137) (0.043)
3 Years After -0.053∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.010) (0.109) (0.166) (0.173) (0.057)
4 or More Years After -0.058∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.238 -0.422 0.184∗∗
(0.013) (0.137) (0.269) (0.275) (0.087)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2138 2069 2069 2069 2069
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.947 0.874 0.882 0.957
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5.3 Firm-level Trade Destruction
I have shown that antidumping measures significantly distort trade both to the US and
the RoW at the product level. I now look at export adjustments within firms. Table 3
presents the results of how antidumping measures shape Chinese firms’ export behavior in
the US. The control group is represented by the firms exporting closely-related products.
Column (1) reports the estimated responses of the effect on export participation at the firm-
product-destination level. Specifically, the estimates show no effects in the years before the
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investigations. This implies that the pre-trend identification assumption is satisfied. How-
ever, two years after the investigation, firms are 2.2 percentage points less likely to export
antidumping-targeted products to the US relative to firms exporting closely-related products.
Table 3: Trade destruction effect on the US at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before 0.014 0.028 -0.038 0.073∗∗
(0.012) (0.094) (0.096) (0.034)
3 Years Before -0.008 0.035 -0.014 0.057∗∗
(0.014) (0.093) (0.091) (0.022)
2 Years Before 0.006 -0.020 -0.027 0.010
(0.007) (0.049) (0.044) (0.018)
Investigation Starts 0.012 -0.042 -0.046∗ 0.006
(0.013) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014)
1 Years After -0.002 -0.080∗ -0.096∗∗ 0.016
(0.008) (0.047) (0.044) (0.022)
2 Years After -0.022∗∗ -0.099 -0.118∗ 0.019
(0.011) (0.068) (0.066) (0.030)
3 Years After 0.009 -0.105 -0.207∗ 0.108∗∗
(0.012) (0.093) (0.106) (0.045)
4 or More Years After -0.010 -0.088 -0.174 0.083∗
(0.015) (0.127) (0.118) (0.047)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 476373 240517 239775 239775
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.414 0.436 0.714
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The following two columns of Table 3 present the results on firms’ intensive margins of
trade: how firm-level export flows to the US are affected by the US import restraints. Both
of them show that pretreatment trends do not differ between treatment and control groups.
Specifically, column (2) indicates that the presence of an antidumping measure has a negative
but only marginally significant effect on the export values of incumbents to the US. Similarly,
column (3) reveals that incumbents which export the targeted products to the US experience a
modest decline in export volumes, approximately ranging from 5% to 20% three years after the
investigation. Notably, the export flows of survivors do not seem to be significantly affected
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by the US imposition of antidumping measures. Therefore, I suspect that the substantial
drop of export flows found at the product level is mainly driven by the extensive margins:
sharp reductions both in export participation and the number of exporters. That is, some
firms may have had to stop shipping the products targeted by the measures entirely, while
the remaining ones are much less negatively affected. In column (5), I estimate Equation
(2) with the log of export prices. It seems that the pre-trend identification assumption is
violated. Therefore, estimations based on this model do not identify the causal effect.
Combining the findings in Table 1 and 3, we see that an increase export costs (i.e., the
imposition of antidumping duties) translates into lower exports through a decrease in export
probability, and a decline in the number of exporters. It is also associated with reductions in
export flows of targeted products from survivors.
5.4 Firm-level Trade Deflection
Do US antidumping measures lead to punished Chinese firms deflecting targeted products
to non-US markets, relative to unpunished firms exporting the same products? Table 4
presents the estimation results where the control group is the unpunished firms that export
US antidumping-targeted products, but only to the RoW. Overall, we may conclude that
Chinese firms which are exposed to the disruption of the US market do not deflect trade flows
to other markets. However, antidumping measures hamper firms’ extensive margin of trade,
which make them less likely to export the targeted products even to alternative markets.
Specifically, in column (1) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a
firm exports a 6-digit HS product to the RoW, which is subject to the US antidumping duty.
We observe that the US-imposed antidumping duty on product p hurts the export probability
to non-US markets by a punished firm. The estimated leads show that there are no pre-trends
before the investigation. In the years after the investigation, an antidumping-punished firm is
between 4.4 to 8.8 percentage points less likely to export the targeted products to the RoW,
relative to a firm that does not face such a tariff hike. The implication is that antidumping
measures may have a deterrent effect which spreads to other destinations from the same
punished firms.
Columns (2) and (3) repeat these estimates where the dependent variables are the firms’
export values and quantities of the targeted products to the RoW. There is little evidence
that firms adjust their export flows to the RoW following the restrictions. My point estimates
in these two columns are always positive, but I cannot reject the hypothesis that they are
equal to zero. Ultimately, antidumping shocks create negative spillovers and have harmful
effects on the ability of affected firms to export the targeted product to other destinations.
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Table 4: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before -0.001 0.069 -0.092 0.161∗∗
(0.017) (0.159) (0.188) (0.072)
3 Years Before 0.001 0.041 -0.065 0.107∗∗
(0.013) (0.145) (0.166) (0.048)
2 Years Before -0.004 0.050 0.002 0.047
(0.011) (0.081) (0.092) (0.029)
Investigation Starts -0.009 -0.026 0.004 -0.030∗∗
(0.013) (0.042) (0.049) (0.013)
1 Years After -0.012 0.001 0.042 -0.036
(0.011) (0.068) (0.089) (0.027)
2 Years After -0.044∗∗∗ 0.002 0.052 -0.049
(0.013) (0.085) (0.110) (0.032)
3 Years After -0.041∗∗ 0.038 0.050 -0.007
(0.018) (0.097) (0.122) (0.039)
4 or More Years After -0.088∗∗∗ 0.116 0.138 -0.019
(0.016) (0.110) (0.149) (0.051)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 726763 378752 378752 378752
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.401 0.448 0.722
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To check the consistency of these estimates with the product-level trade deflection analysis,
in Table 5 I examine whether US trade protections result in punished firms shifting targeted
products to other destinations, relative to unpunished firms exporting closely-related products.
Column (1) reveals that antidumping measures reduce the export probability of the targeted
products to the RoW from a punished firm. Specifically, there is a decline of between 6.2 and
11.8 percentage points in the export probability to the RoW at the firm-product-destination
level. Columns (2) and (3) repeat these estimates for export values and quantities. In years 1
through 3 following the investigation, there is some evidence of rising export flows. The final
estimate indicates a sizable of 16.5 percentage points increase in export values from the 4th
year onwards following the measures.
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Table 5: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before 0.021 0.081 -0.051 0.136∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.102) (0.113) (0.046)
3 Years Before 0.013 0.029 -0.062 0.095∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.107) (0.115) (0.030)
2 Years Before 0.001 0.039 -0.002 0.042∗∗
(0.010) (0.057) (0.060) (0.019)
Investigation Starts -0.014 -0.017 0.006 -0.024∗∗
(0.013) (0.028) (0.032) (0.010)
1 Years After -0.020 0.014 0.039 -0.023
(0.013) (0.036) (0.049) (0.020)
2 Years After -0.062∗∗∗ 0.018 0.044 -0.029
(0.014) (0.048) (0.060) (0.021)
3 Years After -0.060∗∗∗ 0.053 0.025 0.029
(0.018) (0.058) (0.076) (0.031)
4 or More Years After -0.118∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.137∗ 0.027
(0.021) (0.068) (0.076) (0.028)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 933655 477918 476357 476357
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.436 0.478 0.740
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Summing up Table 5, there is some evidence of trade deflection. The US antidumping
measures are associated with the punished firms increasing the trade flows of the targeted
products to third markets. At first blush, this may seem odd, as I find that the imposition of
US import restraints reduces Chinese export flows to third-country markets at the product
level (see Table 2). One explanation for the chilling effect detected at the product level is
attributed to the substantial decline in the number of exporters. Firms hit by US import
restraints but that stay in the market are capable of circumventing the constraints by selling
more to non-US markets. Therefore, we observe from columns (2) and (3) that the punished
firms that continue exporting increase their export flows to alternative markets. That is,
existing exporters reallocate the targeted products across destinations to offset their loss in
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the US market.
5.5 Within-firm Product Switching
It is perfectly plausible that a trade restriction against one line of goods from a given
exporter, f , could have effects on exports of other goods from f . That is, the breadth or extent
of antidumping measures may go beyond the targeted products within firms. Consequently,
I examine whether an antidumping measure against one product influences firms’ export
decisions for other products both to the US and the RoW. First, I focus on how firms reshuffle
export activities across products in the US. The dependent variables in columns (2) and (3)
of Table 6 are firms’ export values and quantities of the closely-related products to the US.
The estimates show that the limitations on trade with the US negatively affect the trade
flows of the closely-related products. Firms that were hit by these trade restraints reduce
their exports of unaffected products to the US.
The use of antidumping measures on one set of products against a firm reduces the trade
flows of other unaffected products from the same firm to the initiation country. That is,
antidumping measures have a deterrent effect on firms, leading them to reduce shipments of
the closely-related products to the US. The antidumping-punished firms may “learn” how to
avoid dumping complaints by lowering the value or volume, and raising the price. In other
words, antidumping measures have a chilling effect on trade beyond the targeted products
within firms. Moreover, combining the findings in Table 3, we conclude that an increase in the
marginal cost of serving one market leads firms to downsize all their exports in that market.
These results demonstrate how the country-product specific nature of antidumping measures
imposes externalities on non-targeted country-product pairs, widening our understanding of
the breadth of such measures.
My results can also be interpreted in light of the literature on heterogeneous firms and
fixed costs of trade (Melitz, 2003). Chinese exporters who may not recover the fixed export
costs required to service the US market reduce the exports both on the targeted and closely-
related products. Consequently, antidumping measures generate greater welfare losses in the
named country than generally recognized.
To complete the analysis of the effects of US antidumping measures on Chinese firms, I
analyze whether trade shifts to other products within a firm to other destinations. In column
(1) of Table 7, my dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm exports an
unaffected 6-digit HS product to the RoW in year t. I find that antidumping measures have a
large negative impact on export participation. The punished firms are less likely to export the
closely-related products to the RoW, relative to their unpunished counterparts. For instance,
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Table 6: Within-firm product switching to the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before 0.082∗∗∗ 0.205 0.057 0.158∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.157) (0.173) (0.042)
3 Years Before 0.052∗∗∗ 0.130 0.110 0.025
(0.013) (0.113) (0.116) (0.031)
2 Years Before 0.041∗∗∗ 0.054 0.054 0.003
(0.009) (0.061) (0.062) (0.018)
Investigation Starts -0.021∗∗∗ -0.050 -0.051 -0.004
(0.007) (0.035) (0.032) (0.022)
1 Years After -0.045∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.067 0.026
(0.010) (0.050) (0.046) (0.028)
2 Years After -0.088∗∗∗ -0.106∗ -0.173∗∗∗ 0.051∗
(0.017) (0.063) (0.061) (0.028)
3 Years After -0.085∗∗∗ -0.073 -0.177∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.104) (0.094) (0.028)
4 or More Years After -0.160∗∗∗ -0.089 -0.180 0.061∗
(0.027) (0.153) (0.145) (0.034)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 275343 136468 135959 135959
Adjusted R2 -0.018 0.444 0.446 0.720
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the export probability of an uninvestigated product in an affected firm decreases by almost 6
percentage points two years after the investigation.
Proceeding across specifications, in column (2) I redefine the dependent variable to be a
firm’s export value of unaffected products to the RoW. The estimates show that there is a 12
percentage increase in the value of exporting the closely-related products for a firm which was
hit with a tariff hike, compared to a firm that does not face the policy change. On the one
hand, antidumping measures have led Chinese firms to reduce the probability of exporting
other unaffected products to the RoW. On the other hand, the decline in trade probability
toward other unaffected products reduces market competition and make the markets more
accessible to survivors. Therefore, firms remaining in the market increase their export flows.
To put it differently, multi-product firms appear to shift exports towards products not affected
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by the tariffs to third markets.
Summarizing the results, antidumping measures do have measurable effects on firms, and
the behavior of the punished firms is clearly more affected than the unpunished firms. An-
tidumping measures cause firms not only to alter export destinations but also to adjust the
scope of products they exports. Multi-product firms could cushion the detrimental effects of
increasing trade costs in one destination through adjustments across products and destina-
tions. I document that within-firm changes in export product mix constitute a significant
channel of firms’ adjustment in response to trade shocks.
Table 7: Within-firm product switching to the RoW
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of
investigation dummy export value export volume export price
4 or More Years Before 0.003 0.202∗∗ 0.115 0.089∗∗
(0.013) (0.091) (0.093) (0.044)
3 Years Before -0.005 0.031 0.001 0.030
(0.013) (0.076) (0.079) (0.025)
2 Years Before -0.001 0.051 0.052 -0.002
(0.010) (0.042) (0.046) (0.015)
Investigation Starts -0.002 0.022 0.029 -0.006
(0.007) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012)
1 Years After -0.014 0.029 0.025 0.005
(0.010) (0.035) (0.034) (0.021)
2 Years After -0.059∗∗∗ 0.034 0.014 0.016
(0.013) (0.051) (0.049) (0.026)
3 Years After -0.035∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.074 0.046∗
(0.015) (0.057) (0.057) (0.025)
4 or More Years After -0.097∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.022
(0.016) (0.069) (0.079) (0.040)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1187834 593817 591812 591812
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.410 0.433 0.729
Standard errors clustered at product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6 Conclusion
Using rich firm-level Chinese customs data over the period 2000-2006, I empirically ex-
amine how antidumping measures contribute to product- and firm-level export dynamics. I
find evidence that US trade restrictions reduce Chinese export flows both to the US and
to alternative markets. Moreover, the imposition of antidumping measures negatively af-
fects the extensive margin of trade. That is, antidumping-targeted products are less likely to
be exported, and there is a reduction in the number of exporting firms across destinations.
Antidumping measures incur collateral damage and distort trade in third markets.
However, the overwhelming distortion impact on trade at the product level hides a very
rich set of within-firm adjustments. To uncover the channel through which aggregate exports
are affected, I further look at their impact at the firm-product level. I document that Chinese
firms that were hit by US antidumping measures are less likely to export the targeted products
across destinations. The implication is that antidumping creates negative externalities that
go beyond the offending country. More importantly, antidumping measures are associated
with spillovers across products within firms. That is, the export flows of uninvestigated
products to the US from the punished firms also experience a modest decline. However,
to compensate their loss in the US market, affected firms tend to switch exports to other
unaffected products in alternative markets. These findings indicate that existing exporters
reallocate their products across destinations following the trade restrictions. They also suggest
that firms facing increasing marginal cost in one market will deviate their exports to another
market. Existing heterogeneous firm models only have constant marginal cost, which ignore
an important constraint on firm choices.
This paper adds to the literature on trade policy and how it affects multi-product firms’
export behavior. Given that the existing literature has focused on evaluating the effects of
antidumping measures by emphasizing on the product level, my finding of significant effects
on the within-firm adjustments implies that the current estimates of the trade distortions
associated with antidumping measures are underestimated.
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7 Appendix
Figure 8: Flow Chart of US’ Antidumping Proceedings
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Figure 9: US antidumping measures against China: average duty per product
Figure 10: Antidumping initiations by year
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USA-AD-874 07-Jul-2000 721420 59.98 133
USA-AD-893 06-Oct-2000 210690, 040900, 170290 183.8 183.8









USA-AD-921 01-Mar-2001 481950, 481920 164.75 164.75
USA-AD-932 04-May-2001 940179, 940171 134.77 70.71
USA-AD-986 30-Nov-2001 720292 78.52 66.71
USA-AD-990 27-Feb-2002 730711 55.13 75.5
USA-AD-1010 08-May-2002 730890, 732690 32.73 15.61
USA-AD-1013 18-Jul-2002 292511 363.22 329.04
USA-AD-1014 13-Sep-2002 390530 97.86 7.86
USA-AD-1020 04-Oct-2002 283660 81.3 81.3
USA-AD-1021 06-Nov-2002 730719 146.41 111.36
USA-AD-1022 29-Nov-2002 281810 218.93 135.18
USA-AD-1034 13-May-2003 852812 78.45 78.45
USA-AD-1043 27-Jun-2003 392321 80.52 77.57
USA-AD-1046 30-Jun-2003 293213 31.33 136.86
USA-AD-1047 08-Jul-2003 940320, 940390 153.76 153.76
USA-AD-1058 10-Nov-2003 940350, 700992 198.08 198.08
USA-AD-1059 21-Nov-2003 871680, 871690 346.94 383.6
USA-AD-1060 28-Nov-2003 320417 370.06 217.94
USA-AD-1070a 23-Feb-2004 480439, 481890, 950590
480261, 482390
266.83 266.83





USA-AD-1071 09-Mar-2004 810419, 810430 177.62 141.49
USA-AD-1082 21-May-2004 293369 179.48 285.63
USA-AD-1091 06-Apr-2005 590190 264.09 264.09
USA-AD-1095 19-Sep-2005 482010, 481022, 481190 258.21 258.21
USA-AD-1103 29-Jun-2006 380210 228.11 228.11
USA-AD-1104 29-Jun-2006 550320 44.3 44.3
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Table 9: Trade destruction effect on the US at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
invetigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
9 or More Quarters Before -0.036 -0.132 -0.300 -0.147 -0.151
(0.058) (0.101) (0.249) (0.246) (0.111)
8 Quarters Prior 0.084∗ -0.105 -0.208 -0.034 -0.174∗
(0.048) (0.081) (0.210) (0.194) (0.101)
7 Quarters Prior 0.071 -0.086 -0.153 -0.023 -0.129
(0.049) (0.071) (0.186) (0.203) (0.139)
6 Quarters Prior 0.075 0.010 0.051 0.158 -0.106
(0.048) (0.070) (0.183) (0.187) (0.113)
5 Quarters Prior 0.084∗ -0.080 -0.006 0.098 -0.104
(0.049) (0.064) (0.172) (0.177) (0.113)
4 Quarters Prior 0.068 -0.192∗∗∗ -0.129 -0.242 0.114
(0.050) (0.067) (0.168) (0.195) (0.128)
3 Quarters Prior 0.017 -0.101∗ 0.021 0.107 -0.087
(0.043) (0.055) (0.147) (0.166) (0.076)
2 Quarters Prior 0.045 0.018 0.136 0.112 0.024
(0.041) (0.048) (0.151) (0.163) (0.071)
Investigation Starts 0.026 -0.129∗∗ -0.170 -0.166 -0.003
(0.038) (0.063) (0.147) (0.176) (0.088)
1 Quarter After 0.031 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.268 -0.135 -0.133
(0.048) (0.070) (0.202) (0.218) (0.126)
2 Quarters After -0.037 -0.279∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗ -0.020
(0.058) (0.102) (0.277) (0.326) (0.118)
3 Quarters After -0.104∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.842∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -0.255∗
(0.052) (0.092) (0.237) (0.223) (0.137)
4 Quarters After -0.129∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -1.069∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗∗ -0.087
(0.052) (0.113) (0.293) (0.315) (0.135)
5 Quarters After -0.124∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗ -0.252∗
(0.058) (0.104) (0.242) (0.251) (0.151)
6 Quarters After -0.166∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.806∗∗∗ -0.544∗ -0.265∗∗
(0.061) (0.135) (0.274) (0.310) (0.133)
7 Quarters After -0.176∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -1.725∗∗∗ -1.525∗∗∗ -0.205
(0.054) (0.123) (0.407) (0.388) (0.197)
8 Quarters After -0.183∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ -1.439∗∗∗ -1.436∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.055) (0.137) (0.378) (0.403) (0.177)
9 or More Quarters or After -0.151∗∗∗ -0.600∗∗∗ -1.529∗∗∗ -1.494∗∗∗ -0.036
(0.053) (0.131) (0.319) (0.321) (0.148)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8236 6012 6012 6009 6009
Adjusted R2 0.491 0.938 0.810 0.763 0.708
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Trade deflection effect on the RoW at the product level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Time relative to Participation log of log of log of log of
invetigation dummy # of exporters export value export volume export price
9 or More Quarters Before -0.035 0.115∗ 0.191 -0.001 0.192∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.069) (0.140) (0.150) (0.059)
8 Quarters Prior 0.059∗∗∗ 0.107 0.144 -0.027 0.172∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.070) (0.124) (0.135) (0.051)
7 Quarters Prior 0.056∗∗∗ 0.095 0.132 -0.004 0.136∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.059) (0.124) (0.131) (0.043)
6 Quarters Prior 0.050∗∗∗ 0.083 0.125 0.025 0.100∗∗
(0.011) (0.053) (0.126) (0.133) (0.045)
5 Quarters Prior 0.047∗∗∗ 0.045 0.098 0.017 0.082∗
(0.011) (0.054) (0.114) (0.125) (0.045)
4 Quarters Prior 0.026∗∗∗ 0.046 0.050 -0.037 0.087∗
(0.008) (0.057) (0.107) (0.118) (0.045)
3 Quarters Prior 0.004 0.073 0.083 -0.028 0.111
(0.014) (0.047) (0.114) (0.176) (0.094)
2 Quarters Prior -0.002 0.006 0.057 0.035 0.023
(0.005) (0.037) (0.082) (0.091) (0.043)
Investigation Starts -0.000 0.011 -0.268∗ -0.278∗∗ 0.010
(0.005) (0.040) (0.137) (0.140) (0.028)
1 Quarter After 0.030∗∗∗ -0.099∗ -0.497∗∗∗ -0.488∗∗ -0.009
(0.009) (0.051) (0.192) (0.206) (0.045)
2 Quarters After 0.020∗∗ -0.065 -0.349∗∗ -0.353∗∗ 0.004
(0.009) (0.048) (0.175) (0.175) (0.038)
3 Quarters After 0.018∗ -0.066 -0.420∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.010) (0.052) (0.149) (0.154) (0.041)
4 Quarters After 0.007 -0.120∗∗ -0.531∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.016) (0.051) (0.165) (0.163) (0.044)
5 Quarters After -0.012 -0.105∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ 0.040
(0.021) (0.052) (0.172) (0.171) (0.043)
6 Quarters After -0.012 -0.203∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.018) (0.071) (0.190) (0.199) (0.048)
7 Quarters After -0.029 -0.222∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗ 0.090∗
(0.023) (0.070) (0.172) (0.178) (0.051)
8 Quarters After -0.019 -0.235∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗ 0.093∗
(0.019) (0.070) (0.179) (0.185) (0.049)
9 or More Quarters or After -0.054∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.122 -0.332∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.077) (0.160) (0.165) (0.059)
Quarterly FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8804 8315 8315 8315 8315
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.949 0.849 0.861 0.932
Standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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